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Continental European unemployment is notorious for its persistence. France, Italy and Ger-
many have had rising unemployment rates from the 1960s up to 2000 and even onward. There
seems to be a consensus now that a combination of shocks and institutional arrangements
lies at the origin of these high unemployment rates (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998, 2007a,
b; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). Neither institutions nor
shocks alone explain the rise in unemployment: institutions have always been there but un-
employment has not (at least not at this level) and shocks have hit many countries but not
all countries have high unemployment rates. The step from this shock-institutions insight
towards ￿nding a solution to the European unemployment problem seems to be short: As
shocks will not go, we need to address the institutions.2
A common suggestion to ￿ght unemployment is to reduce long and generous unemploy-
ment bene￿ts. This raises other questions, however: Should one reduce the length and level
of unemployment bene￿ts in order to reduce unemployment? One seems to be faced by a
classic e¢ ciency-equity trade-o⁄. While reducing unemployment per se is bene￿cial, income
of the unemployed and the insurance mechanism provided by unemployment bene￿ts should
not be neglected.
We examine the employment and welfare e⁄ects of a policy reform which reduces the
length and level of unemployment bene￿ts. We use Germany as an example of a continental
European country for three reasons. First, the unemployment rate in Germany has been
rising for many decades, just as e.g. in France or Italy. Second, the German unemployment
bene￿t system has a two-tier structure which is typical of many OECD countries. Third,
the so-called ￿Hartz IV reform￿implemented in January 2005 comprises both the reduction
of bene￿t levels and the cut of the duration of entitlement. Reforms of this type were
undertaken in many other OECD countries as well (OECD, 2004).
Neglecting minor institutional details, the reform had two main e⁄ects. The maximum
entitlement to unemployment insurance (UI) payments was (almost) uniformly reduced to 12
months (from a former maximum of 32 months). Unemployment assistance (UA) payments,
formerly proportional to net earnings before the job loss, were replaced by a uniform bene￿t
level. The e⁄ect of this new rule on UA payments on long-term unemployed workers was
ambiguous. There are unemployed workers, mainly from low wage groups, whose bene￿t
payments were lower before the reform than afterwards. Those were the ￿winners￿of the
reform (47% of long-term unemployed) - in a static sense. On the other hand, there were
also long-term unemployed workers with relatively high wages before entering unemployment.
These were a⁄ected negatively and their income has dropped (53% of long-term unemployed).
Even though the fraction of ￿winners￿and ￿losers￿is roughly equal, aggregating gains and
losses shows a loss of the average long-term unemployed worker of around 7% (Blos and
Rudolph, 2005; OECD, 2007).
At ￿rst sight, the reform seems to have worked. The reported unemployment rate dropped
from an annual average of 10:5% in 2004 (Bundesagentur f￿r Arbeit, 2009) to 9:0% in 2007.
On the other hand, growth rates in Germany were (for German standards) fairly high.
2This conclusion is even stronger for papers which argue that changes in European unemployment can
mainly be attributed to shifts in labour market institutions and to a lesser extent to the interaction of
institutions with shocks (Nickell et al., 2005).
2While the German economy shrank in 2003, it has recovered since then and probably also
created new jobs. The real GDP grew by 0:8% in 2005, by 3:0% in 2006 and by 2:5% in
2007 (Bundesagentur f￿r Arbeit, 2009). The question therefore arises whether the drop in
unemployment can be credited to the reform. It is also a priori unclear how strongly various
groups were a⁄ected by the reform. Did utility of the (short- and long-term) unemployed or
employed workers rise or fall? Did ￿rms gain from the reform? What about social welfare?
We provide answers by using a model which combines various strands of the literature and
adds some new and essential features. We employ an equilibrium matching framework and
extend the standard textbook model for time-dependent unemployment bene￿ts, endogenous
e⁄ort, risk-averse households, an exogenous ￿spell-e⁄ect￿and Semi-Markov features. Each
of these extensions is crucial. Unemployment bene￿ts in our model need to depend on the
length of the unemployment spell as this is a feature of basically all OECD unemployment
bene￿t systems. Letting agents optimally choose their e⁄ort to ￿nd a job, we can analyze the
incentive e⁄ects of (reforms of) the unemployment bene￿t system. Risk-averse households
are required as we also want to evaluate insurance e⁄ects. The spell-e⁄ect captures the
time-dependence of individual exit rates beyond the incentive e⁄ects induced by the two-
tier system.3 Finally, tools from the Semi-Markov literature are required as they allow
us to deduce aggregate (un)employment from individual search behaviour. We can thereby
compute macro e¢ ciency e⁄ects resulting from micro incentives. Without these Semi-Markov
tools, we would not be able to formulate an equilibrium model.
We solve this model numerically by looking at Bellman equations as di⁄erential equations.
This gives us solutions which are as accurate as numerical precision and which do not require
us to approximate the model in any way. Optimal behaviour implies an exit rate out of
unemployment which is a function of the time spent in unemployment. We thereby obtain a
su¢ ciently ￿ exible endogenous distribution of unemployment duration which we employ for
structural estimation by maximum likelihood.
The main theoretical contribution of our analysis is the explicit treatment of the Semi-
Markov nature of optimal individual behaviour due to the presence of spell-dependent un-
employment bene￿ts: Optimal exit rates not only depend on whether the individual is
unemployed (the current state of the worker) but also on how long an individual has been
unemployed. While this Semi-Markov aspect has been known for a while, it has not been
fully exploited so far in the search literature. Using results from the applied mathematics
literature, we obtain analytic expressions for individual employment probabilities contingent
on current employment status and duration of unemployment - equations of the so-called
Volterra type. They allow us to compute aggregate unemployment rates using a law of large
numbers in our pure idiosyncratic risk economy. Given this link from optimal individual
behaviour to aggregate outcomes, we can analyze the distribution and e¢ ciency e⁄ects of
changes in level and length of unemployment bene￿ts.
The main empirical contribution is the careful structural modelling of exit rates out
of unemployment. Falling unemployment bene￿ts imply an increase of search e⁄ort and
therefore also of individual exit rates over time. Empirical evidence shows, however, that
aggregate exit rates tend to fall. We therefore combine individual incentive e⁄ects with an
3The spell-e⁄ect ￿ (s) will be introduced and speci￿ed in detail below in (4), (21) and (25). Put simply, it
is a function of the duration s of unemployment of an unemployed worker. The parameters of this function
will be estimated.
3exogenous time-decreasing spell-e⁄ect and with unobserved heterogeneity. As is well known,
the latter implies inter alia falling aggregate exit rates even though individual exit rates
are rising. We ￿nd that along with signi￿cant upward pressure of the increasing search
e⁄ort both exogenous spell-e⁄ect and unobserved heterogeneity have signi￿cant in￿ uence
on the dynamics of the exit rates. Conditional on observed and unobserved characteristics,
the exogenous spell-e⁄ect catches up with the e⁄ort e⁄ect of the bene￿t system in the ￿rst
months of unemployment duration and overturns it in the later course of spell progress.
With a policy focus in mind, we emphasize and estimate the trade-o⁄between insurance
and incentive e⁄ects of labour market policies. The degree of risk-aversion - crucial for
understanding the insurance e⁄ect - is jointly estimated with exit rates and the spell-e⁄ect
(and other model parameters). A comparative static analysis, using estimated parameters
for the theoretical model, then allows us to derive precise predictions about the employment
and distribution e⁄ects of changes in the length and level of unemployment bene￿ts.
Providing a short preview of our results, we ￿nd that the reform did decrease the unem-
ployment rate - which is the desirable e⁄ect - but only by 0:3%. Very much to our surprise,
we also ￿nd that the reform increased wages and decreased pro￿ts. Usually, one would ex-
pect that a reduction of alternative income reduces wages. While this channel is present in
our setup as well, the equilibrium e⁄ect of a rise in the number of vacancies per unemployed
worker overcompensates the ￿rst e⁄ect - wages rise when bene￿ts fall. The number of vacan-
cies per unemployed worker rise as lower bene￿ts induce the unemployed to search harder
which in turn induces ￿rms to open more vacancies per unemployed worker. As wages rise,
pro￿ts fall.
This rise in wages is also the reason why the reform is social welfare increasing. The
uninterested worker experiences a rise in expected utility. This is not due to a better insur-
ance mechanism cause by the reform. In fact, the insurance mechanism is worsened when
unemployment bene￿ts are reduced. The rise in expected utility is entirely due to the equi-
librium increase in the wage. The most surprising ￿nding of our analysis is that even the
long-term unemployed workers gain in an intertemporal perspective. Of course, this group
loses instantaneously due to the drop of UA payments. But given the rise in the wage and
the probability that they will ￿nd a job at some later point, they gain. Given our setup, the
Hartz IV reform is Pareto-improving.
Our paper is related to various strands in the literature. From a theoretical perspective,
we build on the search and matching framework of Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985).
Time-dependent unemployment bene￿ts and endogenous e⁄ort have been originally analyzed
by Mortensen (1977) in a one-sided job search model. Equilibrium search and matching
models with time-dependent unemployment bene￿ts include Cahuc and Lehmann (2000)
and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001).4 In these models, exit rates are constant within each
bene￿t regime. This does not fully capture continuously decreasing exit rates as observed in
the data. There also exists a substantial literature that studies optimal insurance allowing
for an arbitrary time path of unemployment bene￿t payments (Shavell and Weiss, 1979;
Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997, 2009; Shimer and Werning, 2007). Our focus is more of a
4Albrecht and Vroman (2005) and Coles and Masters (2007) also have time-dependent unemployment
payments but they do not analyze the implications for individual e⁄ort. Albrecht and Vroman focus on the
equilibrium wage dispersion and ine¢ cient job rejection. Coles and Masters model aggregate uncertainty
implying implicit transfers between ￿rms and the stabilizing e⁄ect this has on the unemployment rate over
the cycle.
4positive nature trying to understand the welfare e⁄ects of existing systems which have a
simpler bene￿t structure than the ones resulting from an optimization approach. We also
allow for an unlimited number of transitions between employment and unemployment and
take equilibrium e⁄ects of wages, vacancies and tax rates into account.5
From an empirical perspective, we estimate a structural parametric duration model with
a ￿ exible distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Time dependence of the hazard function
due to time-dependent bene￿ts is fully described by the equilibrium solution of our theo-
retical model. Structural econometric models with time-dependent bene￿ts were originally
estimated by van den Berg (1990) and Ferrall (1997).6 Van den Berg and van der Klaauw
(2010) extend the setting by introducing time dependence due to monitoring and sanctions.
In contrast to our model, this literature deals with one-sided job search, which makes appli-
cation of its estimates in an equilibrium analysis rather di¢ cult. In addition to that, focus
on the incentive e⁄ect is only partial (van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2010) and insurance
e⁄ect remains largely unaddressed. There also exists a broader empirical equilibrium search
literature that deals with unemployment bene￿t heterogeneity (Bontemps et al., 1999), het-
erogeneity in workers abilities (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002) and heterogeneity in workers
value of nonparticipation (Flinn, 2006). Unlike in our model, however, neither of these con-
tributions takes time-dependent unemployment bene￿ts or equilibrium wage, vacancy and
tax e⁄ects into account.7
Semi-Markov methods are taken from the applied mathematical literature, see e.g. Kulka-
rni (1995) or Corradi et al. (2004). Economic papers which allowed for Semi-Markov features
(e.g. Burdett et al., 1985, Aase, 1990, Magnac et al., 1995) focused on time-varying exit rates
but did not exploit their full potential, i.e. they did not use Volterra equations which we
need here for equilibrium considerations.
Finally, there is a very small academic literature which discusses the Hartz reforms. Heer
(2006) provides a ￿tentative analysis￿which does not explicitly look at the e⁄ects of a two-
tier system. Fahr and Sunde (2009) focus on aspects of the Hartz reforms (Hartz I-III) which
do not a⁄ect unemployment bene￿ts. Franz et al. (2007) study the e⁄ects of Hartz IV in a
CGE model focusing on the impact on various household types.
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model, in-
stitutional setting, behaviour of supply and demand sides and the combination of both in
economic welfare. Section 3 describes the equilibrium properties of the model. Section 4
illustrates the structural estimation and the underlying data. The simulation results and the
evaluation of the institutional reform are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We use a Mortensen-Pissarides type matching model and extend it for time-dependent unem-
ployment bene￿ts, endogenous e⁄ort, risk-averse households and an exogenous spell-e⁄ect.
5Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Moscarini (2005) use a general equilibrium model, but their setting is
restricted to time-invariant bene￿ts only.
6Frijters and van der Klaauw (2006) develop a nonstationary search model with nonparticipation. Paser-
man (2008) provides a structural estimation taking hyperbolic discounting into account. See also Eckstein
and van den Berg (2007) for literature review on nonstationary empirical search models.
7A general equilibrium model (of economic growth) is estimated by Lentz and Mortensen (2008).
5To solve it, we use Semi-Markov tools. The separation rate for jobs is constant and there
is no search on the job. We focus on steady states in our analysis. Households are ex-ante
identical but endogenously heterogenous in their unemployment duration.
2.1 Production, bene￿ts and employment
The economy has a work force of exogenous constant size N: Employment is endogenous and
given by L and the number of unemployed amounts to N ￿L: Firms produce under perfect
competition on the goods market and each worker-￿rm match produces output A, which is
constant. The match can be interrupted by exogenous causes which occur according to a
time-homogenous Poisson process with a constant arrival rate ￿.
Unemployed workers receive UI bene￿ts bUI and UA bene￿ts bUA. In basically all OECD
countries, UI bene￿ts are paid for a certain number of months, after which UA bene￿ts are
paid. We denote entitlement length to UI bene￿ts by ￿ s and assume that it is identical for




bUI 0 ￿ s ￿ ￿ s
bUA ￿ s < s : (1)
We assume bUI > bUA ￿ 0. Re￿ ecting the institutional setup in most OECD countries and
in Germany best, we consider bUA and bUI to be proportional to the net wage w earned at
the moment the worker loses the job. With e.g. ￿UI denoting the UI replacement rate, we
obtain
bUI = ￿UIw: (2)
This replacement rate will play a role in the wage setting equation and in the numerical
implementation of the reform.
An unemployed worker ￿nds a job according to a time-inhomogeneous Poisson process
with arrival rate ￿(:): This rate will also be called the job-￿nding rate, hazard rate or exit
rate out of unemployment. We allow this rate to depend on e⁄ort ￿(s) an individual exerts to
￿nd a job. E⁄ort depends on the length s this individual has been spending in unemployment
since her last job. If s > ￿ s; the individual will be called long-term unemployed.
In addition to e⁄ort, the exit rate of an individual will also depend on aggregate labour
market conditions and on something which we call a spell-e⁄ect. Labour market conditions
are captured by labour market tightness ￿; i.e. the ratio of the number of vacancies V divided
by the number of unemployed,
￿ ￿ V=(N ￿ L): (3)
We assume that e⁄ort and tightness are multiplicative: no e⁄ort implies permanent unem-
ployment and no vacancies imply that any e⁄ort is in vain. The spell-e⁄ect captures all
factors exogenous to the individual which a⁄ects her exit rate out of unemployment. This
can include stigma (Vishvanath, 1989), ranking (Blanchard and Diamond, 1994) and gains
or losses in individual search productivity. We denote this e⁄ect by ￿ (s): Assuming that a
8Put di⁄erently, we do not let ￿ s be a function of past employment history. See the discussion after (13)
for an extension.
6stigma becomes worse the longer s; we would expect ￿ (s) to fall in s: Summarizing, the exit
rate will be of the form ￿(￿(s)￿;￿ (s)):9
There is a long discussion in the literature whether duration dependence taking the form
of aggregate falling exit rates is due to a spell-e⁄ect (as modeled here by ￿ (s)) or due to
unobserved heterogeneity (Kiefer and Neumann, 1981, Flinn and Heckman, 1982, Heckman
and Singer, 1984b and van den Berg and van Ours, 1996). We take unobserved heterogeneity
into account in our empirical part and discuss its e⁄ects there.
The outcome of our time-varying exit rate will be an endogenous distribution of unem-
ployment duration. Its density is given by (e.g. Ross, 1996, ch. 2)




This density will be crucial later for various purposes including the estimation of model
parameters. It is endogenous to the model, as the exit rate ￿(￿(s)￿;￿ (s)) is determined by
the optimizing behaviour of workers and ￿rms.
Unemployment bene￿t payments to short- and long-term unemployed are ￿nanced by a
tax rate ￿ on gross wages. The labour tax ￿ implies that the net wage is w = (1 ￿ ￿)wgross.
The number of short-termunemployed workers is
R ￿ s
0 f (s)ds(N ￿ L) and
R 1
￿ s f (s)ds(N ￿ L)














The government adjusts the wage tax ￿ such that this constraint holds at each point in time.
2.2 Optimal behaviour
Households are in￿nitely lived and do not save. They have a strictly positive time preference
rate ￿: The present value of having a job is given by V (w) and depends on the current
endogenous wage w only. Employed workers enjoy instantaneous utility u(w). The value
V (w) is constant in a steady state as the wage is constant, but di⁄ers across steady states.
Whenever a worker loses her job, she enters the unemployment bene￿t system by obtaining
insurance payments bUI for the length of ￿ s. Hence, the value of being unemployed when just
having lost the job is given by V (bUI;0) where 0 stands for a spell of length zero. This leads
to a Bellman equation for the employed worker of
￿V (w) = u(w) + ￿[V (bUI;0) ￿ V (w)]. (6)
The Bellman equation for the unemployed worker reads










The instantaneous utility ￿ ow of being unemployed, ￿V (b(s);s); is given by three compo-
nents. The ￿rst component shows the instantaneous utility resulting from consumption of
9Given our focus on individual search behaviour, we start at the individual level and then derive a
matching function (see the discussion following (22)) rather than the other way round. Both ways are of
course equivalent.
7b(s) and e⁄ort ￿(s). The second component is a deterministic change of V (b(s);s) as the
value of being unemployed changes over time. The third component is a stochastic change
that occurs at the job-￿nding rate ￿(￿(s)￿;￿ (s)): When a job is found, an unemployed
worker gains the di⁄erence between the value of being employed V (w) and V (b(s);s).
An optimal choice of e⁄ort ￿(s) for (7) requires
u￿(s) (b(s);￿(s)) + ￿￿(s) (￿(s)￿;￿ (s))[V (w) ￿ V (b(s);s)] = 0; (8)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. It states that the utility loss resulting from
increasing search e⁄ort must be equal to expected utility gain due to higher e⁄ort.
As unemployment bene￿ts are discontinuous at ￿ s; the question arises what happens to
the value of being unemployed at this point. Value functions measure overall utility from
optimal behaviour between now and the end of the planning horizon. As the value of being
unemployed depends on unemployment bene￿ts and unemployment duration only, it seems
natural to assume that the value an instant before ￿ s and after ￿ s are identical. In fact, we
assume that
V (bUI; ￿ s) = V (bUA; ￿ s): (9)
The value of a job J to a ￿rm is given by instantaneous pro￿ts A ￿ w=(1 ￿ ￿), which
is the di⁄erence between revenue A and the gross wage w=(1 ￿ ￿), reduced by the risk of
being driven out of business
￿J = A ￿ w=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿[J ￿ J0], (10)
where ￿ > 0 stands for the interest rate (being identical to the discount rate of households)
and where J0 is the value of a vacancy.
Given that individual arrival rates are functions of the individual unemployment spell,
the expected rate of exit out of unemployment is just the mean over individual arrival rates,




￿(￿(s)￿;￿ (s))f (s)ds. (11)
As a consequence, the vacancy ￿lling rate is ￿
￿1￿ ￿: The value of a vacant job is ￿J0 =
￿￿ + ￿
￿1￿ ￿[J ￿ J0]: With free entry, the value of holding a vacancy is J0 = 0, leading to
J = ￿￿=￿ ￿. (12)
Modelling wage setting for any country is a big challenge. Looking at Germany, almost
two thirds of all wages and salaries are the outcome of negotiations between industry unions
and employer federations.10 Labour income not covered by central negotiations is determined
either by individual bargaining, by wage posting or other. As we do not want to model
heterogeneity in wage setting in this paper, we assume that all wages are the outcome of
collective bargaining. The question then arises what the objective of unions and employer
federations are. The main issue thereby is to what extend the interest of unemployed workers
10This is in contrast to collective bargaining at the ￿rm level as modelled e.g. by Cahuc and Lehmann
(2000). Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) consider the case of a monopoly union which sets the share ￿ of
the surplus going to the worker. The ￿rm responds by creating and destroying jobs.
8are taken into account. As almost all members of unions are employed, we assume here that
wages are determined by insiders, i.e. those who currently have a job. Due to its analytical
convenience, we also assume that wages are determined by Nash bargaining. We discuss
alternatives in a moment.
In case of successful negotiations, the collective value of employed workers is V (w(t))L(t):
If bargaining fails, workers receive unemployment bene￿ts which - given institutional rules -
depend on previous employment history and age. If we make entitlement length ￿ s from (1)
a function of e.g. the employment history, we would obtain a distribution of ￿ s. While this
would not create major problems, we value the advantages of a theoretical model with a rep-
resentative agent (estimation does take heterogeneity in ￿ s into account). We therefore give
the same entitlement ￿ s to all individuals, independently of their employment history. Hence,
if bargaining fails, the collective value of L(t) workers is V (b(0);0)L(t): The collective

















Following the steps as in Pissarides (1985) for risk-neutral or Lehmann and van der Linden
(2007) for risk-averse individuals, our setup for collective bargaining with a replacement rate
(2) yields (see app. B.1.1)













is generalized marginal utility from consumption. The ￿rst term uw (w) in (14) is marginal
utility from consumption as an employed worker. The second term is the generalization
due to the fact that bUI is proportional to the previously earned wage: An increase in the
bargained wage a⁄ects (the present value of expected) marginal utility from consumption if
unemployed at a later point in time. If UI payments were not proportional to the previously
earned wage, mw (:) would be given by uw (w): The left hand side of (13) corresponds to
what in models with risk-neutrality is simply the wage rate w. On the right hand side,
bene￿ts for the unemployed (for risk-neutral households and no time-dependence of e⁄ort),
are replaced by instantaneous utility from being unemployed, u(bUI;￿(0)). The contribution
of the production side in squared brackets is translated into ￿utils￿ by multiplying with
generalized marginal utility and takes tax e⁄ects into account.
As mentioned before, any real world economy exhibits a multitude of wage setting mech-
anisms. We are aware of the many alternatives to Nash bargaining and also to the structure
of Nash bargaining used here. One alternative to its structure would consist in specifying
an outside option where each individual worker would be entitled to UI payments according
to past employment history. In the case of individual bargaining, an endogenous wage dis-
tribution would arise (see Albrecht and Vroman, 2005). With a distribution of employment
history, there would be a distribution of outside options and therefore a distribution of wages.
In our case of collective bargaining, however, we would still obtain a unique wage. With l
9denoting employment history, ￿ s(l) would denote the length of entitlement to UI payments.11
One would then replace V (b(0);0) by
R 1
0 V (b(0);0; ￿ s(l))g (l)dl; where g (l) is the distrib-
ution for employment duration. Clearly,
R 1
0 V (b(0);0; ￿ s(l))g (l)dl is a ￿xed quantity such
that the wage would remain unique.
An alternative to Nash bargaining itself consists in strategic bargaining. Strategic bar-
gaining is the appropriate choice when payo⁄s change over time as Nash bargaining would
correspond to myopic behaviour (Coles and Wright, 1998; Coles and Muthoo, 2003). Strate-
gic bargaining was also used in the analysis of on-the-job search (Cahuc et al., 2006, Shimer,
2006) and in Hall and Milgrom (2008) who stress that employment ￿ uctuations under Nash
bargaining are too small. As our collective bargaining setup is the most appropriate assump-
tion for Germany which implies that collective payo⁄s are stationary and as we do not focus
on business cycle issues, we feel justi￿ed in using Nash bargaining here.
2.3 The social welfare function
In addition to the incentive e⁄ect of the reform, we would also like to understand the in-
surance e⁄ect. In a world without moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance would
require unemployment bene￿ts to be equal to the net wage. With e⁄ort being a function of
unemployment bene￿ts, insurance considerations must take into account that e⁄ort decreases
in unemployment bene￿ts.
We can easily understand whether the insurance e⁄ect was taken into account in an
appropriate way by computing expected utility of an individual being ￿behind the Rawlsian
veil of ignorance￿ . This is similar in spirit to social welfare functions employed by Hosios
(1990) or Flinn (2006). One can alternatively look at this expected utility as average utility















It adds the share L=N of employed workers times their welfare V (w) to the share (N ￿ L)=N
of unemployed workers times the average welfare of an unemployed. This average is obtained
by integrating over all spells s, where f (s) is the endogenous density (4), with exit rates
￿(￿(s)￿;￿ (s)) that follow from the steady state solution of the model, and the V (b(s);s)
are the values of being unemployed with a spell s and bene￿t payments b(s) from (1).12
3 Equilibrium properties
3.1 Individual (un)employment probabilities
In models with constant job-￿nding and separation rates, the number (or measure) of em-
ployees can easily be derived by assuming a law of large numbers. Aggregate employment
11In an empirical implementation, age would be an additional argument for ￿ s(l):
12Our social welfare function does not take the value J of a ￿rm into account. The resource cost ￿ for
￿nancing a vacancy are also neglected. We could transfer the balance ￿L ￿ ￿M to households. As this
balance rises in the reform in all of our quantitative analyses, our quantitative results below would not
change if the balance was taken into account.
10then follows _ L = ￿[N ￿ L] ￿ ￿L. With spell-dependent e⁄ort, individual arrival rates ￿(:)
are heterogeneous and the number of employees needs to be derived using techniques from the
literature on Semi-Markov or renewal processes, e.g. Kulkarni (1995) or Corradi et al. (2004).
We need the number of employees in order to compute the unemployment rate and for com-
puting income and expenditure in the government budget constraint. These Semi-Markov
tools are therefore essential for any equilibrium model with time-dependent unemployment
bene￿ts.
The generalization of Semi-Markov processes compared to continuous time Markov chains
consists in allowing the transition rate from one state to another to depend on the time an
individual has spent in the current state. We apply this here and let the transition rate from
unemployment to employment depend on the time s the individual has been unemployed.
Hence, switching from a constant job-￿nding rate ￿ to a spell-dependent rate ￿(s) implies
switching from Markov to Semi-Markov processes. Processes are called ￿semi￿as the history-
dependence of the job ￿nding rate ￿(s) is not Markov. Processes are still called ￿Markov￿as
history no longer counts once an individual has found a job. This is also why these processes
are related to renewal processes: whenever a transition to a new state occurs, the system
starts from the scratch, it is ￿renewed￿and history vanishes.
We start by looking at individual employment probabilities. Let pij (￿;s(t)) describe
the probability with which an individual, who is in state i (either e for employed or u for
unemployed) today in t, will be in state j 2 fe;ug at some future point in time ￿, given that
her current spell is now s(t). Starting with an individual that just lost her job, i.e. s(t) = 0;
and taking into account that the separation rate ￿ remains constant, these expressions read
(see app. A.5),














￿￿[v￿t]￿puu (￿ ￿ v;0)dv: (16b)
Expressions for complementary transitions are given by pue (￿) = 1 ￿ puu (￿) and pee (￿) =
1 ￿ peu (￿), respectively.
These equations have a straightforward intuitive meaning. Consider ￿rst the case of ￿
being not very far in the future. Then all integrals (for ￿ = t) are zero and the probability
of being unemployed at ￿ is, if unemployed at t; one from (16a) and, if employed at t, zero
from (16b). For a ￿ > t; the part e￿
R ￿
t ￿(s(y))dy in (16a) gives the probability of remaining in
unemployment for the entire period from t to ￿: An individual unemployed today can also
be unemployed in the future if she remains unemployed from t to v (the probability of which
is e￿
R v
t ￿(s(y))dy), ￿nds the job in v (which requires multiplication with the exit rate ￿(s(v)))
and then moves from employment to unemployment again over the remaining interval ￿ ￿v
(for which the probability is peu (￿ ￿ v)). Note that the probability peu (￿ ￿ v) allows for
an arbitrary number of transitions in and out of employment between v and ￿ (see ￿g. 8 in
app. A.5 for an illustration). As this path is possible for any v between t and ￿; the densities
for these paths are integrated. The sum of the probability of remaining unemployed all of the
time and of ￿nding a job at some v but being unemployed again at ￿ gives then the overall
probability puu (￿;0) of having no job in ￿ when having no job in t: The interpretation of
(16b) is similar. The probability of remaining employed from t to v is simpler, e￿￿[v￿t]; as the
11separation rate ￿ is constant. The individual then loses the job at v requiring the transition
rate ￿ and then moves back and forth between unemployment and employment to eventually
end up in unemployment at ￿ or earlier. The latter is captured by puu (￿ ￿ v;0):
As we can see, these equations are interdependent: The equation for puu (￿;0) depends on
peu (￿ ￿ v) and the equation for peu (￿), in turn, depends on puu (￿ ￿ v;0). Formally speaking,
these equations are integral equations, sometimes called Volterra equations of the ￿rst type
(16b) and of the second type (16a). Integral equations can sometimes be transformed into
di⁄erential equations, which will simplify their solution in practice. In our case, however, no
transformation into di⁄erential equations is known.
After having computed the probability of being unemployed in ￿ when being unemployed
in t for individuals that just became unemployed in t, i.e. who have a spell of length s(t) =
0; we will need an expression for puu (￿;s(t)). This means, we will need the transition
probabilities for individuals with an arbitrary spell s(t) of unemployment. Luckily, given
the results from (16a and b), this probability is straightforwardly given by









t ￿(s(y))dy￿(s(v))peu (￿ ￿ v)dv: (17)
An unemployed with spell s(t) in t has di⁄erent exit rates ￿(s(y)) which, however, are known
from our analysis of optimal behaviour at the individual level. Hence, only the integrals in
(17) are di⁄erent, the probabilities peu (￿ ￿ v) can be taken from the solution of (16a and b).
The notation puu (￿;s(t)) in (17) and peu (￿) in (16b) nicely re￿ ects the Semi-Markov
nature of this setup: When employed in t, the probability peu (￿) of being unemployed in ￿
is not a function of the past and the only argument of peu (￿) is time ￿: When unemployed
in t, the probability puu (￿;s(t)) of being unemployed in the future ￿ as well is a function
of the past and this is captured by the argument s(t):
3.2 Aggregate unemployment
We can now compute the expected number of unemployed for any cross-section distribution
of spells H (s(t)),
Et [N ￿ L(￿)] = [N ￿ L(t)]
Z 1
0
puu (￿;s(t))dH (s(t)) + peu (￿)L(t): (18)
We start at the end of this equation, noting that there are L(t) employed workers in t. The
expected number of unemployed workers at some ￿ ￿ t coming from currently employed
workers is given by peu (￿)L(t): Again, one should keep in mind that the probability peu (￿)
allows for an arbitrary number of switches between employment and unemployment between
t and ￿; i.e. it takes permanent turnover into account.
For the unemployed, we compute the mean over all probabilities of being unemployed in
the future by integrating over puu (￿;s(t)) given the current distribution H (s(t)) : Multi-
plying this by the number of unemployed today, N ￿ L(t), gives us the expected number
of unemployed at ￿ out of the pool of unemployed in t. The sum of these two expected
quantities gives the expected number of unemployed at some future point ￿: Dividing by N
gives the expected unemployment rate at ￿:
12When we focus on a steady state, we let ￿ approach in￿nity. In a steady state, the cross-
section distribution H (s(t)) is identical to the distribution F (s) whose density is given in
(4). In order to obtain a simple expression for the aggregate unemployment rate, we exploit
the pure idiosyncratic-risk structure where micro-uncertainty cancels out at the aggregate
level. Hence, we assume that a law of large numbers holds and the population share of
unemployed workers equals the average individual probability of being unemployed. This
allows us to express (18) for a steady state as (N ￿ L)=N = [(N ￿ L)=N]
R 1
0 puu (s)dF (s)+
peuL=N: We have replaced L(￿) = L(t) by the steady state employment level L and the
individual probabilities by the steady state expressions puu (s) and peu: The probability peu
is no longer a function of ￿ as this probability will not change in steady state, while there















0 pue (s)dF (s)
; (19)
where the second expression is more parsimonious.
If we assumed a constant job arrival rate here, we would get peu = puu = ￿=(￿ + ￿)
and pue = ￿=(￿ + ￿). Inserting this into our steady state results would yield the standard
expression for the unemployment rate, (N ￿ L)=N = ￿=(￿ + ￿). In our generalized setup,
the long-run unemployment rate is given by the ratio of individual probability peu to be
unemployed when employed today divided by this same probability plus
R 1
0 pue (s)dF (s).
3.3 Functional forms
Estimation and a numerical solution require functional forms. We assume that the instan-






E⁄ort is measured in utility terms. The utility function of an employed worker has the same
structure only that consumption is given by w and there is no explicit e⁄ort. One could
therefore look at ￿ as a measure of the di⁄erence between disutility from searching and
disutility from work.
The spell-e⁄ect is captured by
￿ (s) = ￿0g (s); (21)
where g (s) is speci￿ed in the next section. The arrival rate of jobs ￿(￿(s)￿;￿ (s)) is assumed
to obey
￿(￿(s)￿;￿ (s)) = ￿ (s)[￿(s)￿]
￿ ; (22)
This speci￿cation can easily be made plausible when linking it to a matching function. The
matching function represents the aggregate arrival rate and equals the sum over individual
arrival rates, m(N ￿ L;V ) = (N ￿ L)
R




and using (3), we ￿nd m(N ￿ L;V ) = ￿[N ￿ L]
1￿￿ V ￿:13 This shows that we succeed in
identifying the elasticity ￿ of vacancies as we assume that both e⁄ort and tightness have the
same power ￿ in (22).
13Note that one could argue (see e.g. Cahuc and Lehman, 2000 or Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001) that
134 Structural estimation
4.1 Exit rates out of unemployment
Before we estimate the model using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP),
we need to specify the functional forms for our spell-e⁄ect (21).14 In order to do so, we
consider the distributional aspects of our data on the observed unemployment duration.
Fig. 1 shows the nonparametric estimates of the hazard functions from the entire sample of
unemployment durations (solid line) and the subsample of individuals with the entitlement
length equal to 12 months (dashed line).15 The illustration focuses on the ￿rst 2.5 years of
unemployment.







Entire sample of unemployed
Enitiled to 12 months of UI
Figure 1 Non-parametric hazard functions (entire sample and ￿ s = 12)
We see a clear downward time dependence of the exit risk. On the one hand, this may
be the evidence of the true downward state dependence of an individual hazard rate (see
e.g. van den Berg and van Ours, 1996, or Eckstein and Wolpin, 1995, for the evidence of
this). On the other hand, this may be due to some neglected heterogeneity. Generally,
individuals may di⁄er with respect to certain observed and unobserved characteristics that
condition the unemployment duration (see e.g. Heckman and Singer, 1984a,b). As far as
the German bene￿t system is concerned, an additional source of unobserved heterogeneity
is the eligibility to UA bene￿ts. Not all individuals receiving UI bene￿ts may be eligible to
the individual arrival rate is a function of the ratio V=(￿U) and not of the ratio ￿ = V=U as used here. The
former speci￿cation would assume a negative externality: If some other unemployed workers search harder,
the arrival rate of an individual - ceteris paribus - decreases. Computing the aggregate matching function
would then yield m(U;V ) = (￿U)
1￿￿ V ￿: We do not believe that this will make a major quantitative
di⁄erence and we therefore stick to our speci￿cation. For details, see app. B.1.2. We are grateful to
Jean-Marc Robin for having raised this point.
14For more background on the SOEP, our sampling method and for descriptive statistics, see app. A.1.
15We use the Tanner and Wong (1983) smoothed nonparametric hazard function estimator with bias
correction. Kernel function is Gaussian. Optimal bandwith is estimated by cross-validation discussed in
Tanner and Wong (1984).
14UA bene￿ts once the entitlement period expires. Eligibility to UA bene￿ts is determined
at the ￿means test￿ , where an individual has to provide lengthy information about income
sources of the household, number and age of dependents etc. If the means are su¢ cient,
the person becomes ineligible to UA bene￿ts, but might still claim social assistance, which
eventually may or may not be provided. Unobservability for the econometrician results from
the fact that, once exit out of unemployment occurs before the expiration of entitlement,
an econometrician cannot know about the outcome of the means test. The individuals
themselves, however, are very likely to know what the result of the test will be. If they
expect to fail the test, they would search harder and therefore exit faster. This behaviour, if
uncontrolled for, results in a decreasing nonparametric estimate of the hazard rate, just as
it would be under the in￿ uence of some individual-speci￿c unobserved component. Clearly,
the true individual exit rate in this case may as well be constant, or increasing up to the
expiration of entitlement and constant thereafter, as in Mortensen (1977), van den Berg
(1991) and also in our theoretical model.16 Finally, both true individual state dependence
and unobserved heterogeneity may manifest themselves simultaneously (see e.g. van den Berg
and van Ours, 1996, 1999, for evidence of this in U.S. and French data respectively).17
Summarizing, the individual exit rate derived from the theoretical model must be su¢ -
ciently ￿ exible to capture both of these aspects. It needs to have a parametric form ￿ exible
enough to replicate the observed downward pattern even if no unobserved heterogeneity is
present. At the same time, it needs to make provision for unobserved heterogeneity with re-
spect to the outcome of the means test and unmeasured individual characteristics, so that it
could match the observed downward pattern even if the true individual exit risks are increas-
ing or constant. Our aim is to provide a fully structural econometric model that estimates




Our data are sampled as a ￿ ow of entrants into unemployment and employment. The exit
rate from our theoretical model is given by (22). The e⁄ort level ￿(s) needs to be replaced
by the optimal value implied by the ￿rst-order condition (8), i.e. ￿(s) is a function of the
duration s given the particular bene￿t environment (UI and UA payments together with the
entitlement length ￿ s), the spell-e⁄ect ￿ (s), the wage w and the labour market density ￿. To
stress this dependence but to keep notation short, we group these explanatory variables into
a vector z ￿fbUI;bUA; ￿ s;w;￿g and write ￿ = ￿(s;z). Please note that even though w and ￿
are endogenous to the theoretical model they are exogenous to the duration of unemployment
which is our dependent variable. One can therefore either substitute them out using their
theoretical solutions, which depend on the productivity A and vacancy costs ￿ among others,
or one can use the data on w and ￿ directly. Using the data on w and ￿ directly simpli￿es
16Gonzalez and Shi (2010) suggest that learning about one￿ s own ability while searching increases the
individual exit rate but might imply falling job-￿nding rates (probabilities in their discrete-time setup) for
a given cohort.
17We de￿ne ￿not passing the means test￿in our application as complete ineligibility both to UA bene￿ts
and social assistance.
15an already complex numerical task of ￿tting the nonstationary model, making it faster by
a factor of about 4. Moreover, it lifts the necessity of having employer-side data which are
unavailable in SOEP as well as in any other typical panel household survey.
Clearly, there also exist other variables that may potentially in￿ uence both the search
e⁄ort and the spell-e⁄ect, a⁄ecting thereby the exit rate out of unemployment (22). These
variables may be either observable, such as gender, education level etc., or unobservable,
like for instance individual ability of performing a job or looking for jobs. We group the
observed explanatory variables in a vector x and assume that x enters the spell-e⁄ect and
the separation rate with parameters ￿￿ and ￿￿, respectively. Likewise, we represent the
unobserved component by ￿ and assume that it in￿ uences the spell-e⁄ect and the separation
rate via the parameters ￿￿ and ￿￿, respectively. Hence, the spell-e⁄ect (21) now reads
￿ (s;x;￿) = ￿0 (x;￿)g (s) and the separation rate reads ￿(x;￿).18
Having introduced observed and unobserved characteristics, the exit rate from (22) can
be written as
￿j (s;x;z;￿) = ￿ (s;x;￿)[￿(s;x;z;￿)￿]
￿ , j = UI, UA, (23)
where for ease of distinction j indicates either the UI or the UA regime.19 In (23) also note
that since the optimal search e⁄ort depends on both the spell-e⁄ect and the separation rate
(see app. A.2), x and v will always implicitly enter the ￿(s;z) via ￿ (s;x;￿) and ￿(x;￿).
We have four di⁄erent types of labour market histories in our data set. The ￿rst group
consists of individuals who enter unemployment with the right to claim UI bene￿ts and exit
unemployment before the expiration of entitlement period (s ￿ ￿ s). As argued in sect. 4.1,
for these individuals we do not observe the outcome of the means test for eligibility to bUA.
We do assume, however, that individuals know about the outcome even before applying for
bUA. Let ￿(s;zj0) indicate the search e⁄ort given that bUA = 0, which corresponds to the
hypothetical failure at the test. Similarly, let ￿(s;zjbUA) stand for the hypothetical case in
which the test will be passed (and so, bUA > 0). Finally, let ￿ denote the fraction of the
individuals that pass the test. Then, given the observed and unobserved characteristics, the
individual contribution to the likelihood in this group is










where du is a dummy variable such that du = 1 if unemployment spell is uncensored.
The second group comprises individuals who enter unemployment with the right to claim
UI bene￿ts, fail to ￿nd a job before entitlement expires, transit to either UA or zero bene￿t
level and thereby reveal the outcome of the means test, and exit unemployment (or not)
18It would be desireable to integrate some aspects of the described ex-ante heterogeneity into the theoretical
model right from the beginning. Our objective, however, is to focus on the implications of a two-tier bene￿t
system under optimal e⁄ort with anticipated end date of the entitlement. We therefore leave theoretical
treatment of complementary ex ante heterogeneity for future research. It is standard in the literature to
model the basic feature of optimal behaviour one is interested in and capture the rest of heterogeneity in
the econometric part (see e.g. van den Berg and Ridder, 1998, or Flinn, 2006).
19Appendix A.3 shows the di⁄erential equation that solves for ￿j (s) once optimal search e⁄ort is substi-
tuted out.
16only after the expiration of entitlement (s > ￿ s). For such individuals, the contribution to










￿ s ￿UA(u;x;z;￿)du, (24b)
where dt is a dummy variable such that dt = 1 if we observe that an individual passes the
means test.
The third group embarks all individuals who do not have the right to claim UI bene￿ts
and enter unemployment receiving lower UA bene￿ts from the very beginning (dt = 1) or
not receiving bene￿ts at all (dt = 0). Their contribution to the likelihood is therefore
‘(s;x;z;￿) = ￿






Our ￿nal group consists of entrants to employment. Conditional on observed and unob-




where dj is a dummy variable such that dj = 1 if employment spell is uncensored and l is
the duration of employment.
The parameterization of ￿0 in the spell-e⁄ect is standard, namely ￿0 (x;￿) = expfx0￿￿ +
￿￿￿g, where x contains an intercept. Similarly, the conditional separation rate is parame-
terized as ￿(x;￿) = expfx0￿￿ + ￿￿￿g. Since ￿ is unobservable, identi￿cation requires that
either ￿￿ or ￿￿ should be normalized. We set ￿￿ = 1. Finally, our parametric assumptions
about the shape of g (s) from the spell-e⁄ect (21) are
g (s) = S (s;￿) + 1, (25)
where S (s;￿) denotes a survivor function of the chi-square distribution with ￿ degrees of
freedom (see app. B.3.2). Intercept in x plays a role of a scale parameter in the distribu-
tion of unemployment duration, adjusting g (s) appropriately. Our choice of this particular
functional form in (25) is motivated by the nonparametric estimates in ￿g. 1, where even in
absence of unobserved heterogeneity the individual exit risk is well-matched by the reverse
S-shaped curve. Sensitivity analyses with other parametric alternatives, e.g. the survivor
function of the Weibull distribution, which has one parameter more, have shown no signi￿-
cant improvement in the model ￿t.
We are ￿nally left with specifying the distribution of the unobserved component. As is
common in the reduced-form literature starting with Heckman and Singer (1984b), as well as
in the structural estimation literature (see e.g. van den Berg and Ridder, 1998 or Frijters and
van der Klaauw, 2006), we assume that unobserved heterogeneity has a discrete distribution
with K points of support, f￿kgK
k=1. Let pk denote the probability mass attached to the
k-th point of support. With this assumption, the likelihood contribution of an unemployed




where ‘(s;x;z;￿k) is any of the contributions in (24a)-(24c), depending on a particular type





where ‘(l;x) is shown in (24d).
17￿ Estimation procedure
Estimation of model parameters uses a part of the numerical solution method for the
steady state. As described in app. A.2, for a given wage w and vacancy to unemployment
ratio ￿, the individual exit rate can be computed at any moment of the unemployment spell.
Using the individual survey data implies that the wage w for each individual is known and
the corresponding ￿ can be taken from macro data. Thus for any given parameter vector
individual exit rates immediately follow. Details on the implementation can be found in
app. A.3 and app. B.3.1.
Note that the model is estimated without explicitly specifying the wage setting mech-
anism. If we used linked employer-employee data, the model could be estimated by using
the observable productivity data. This would also allow us to estimate the bargaining power
parameter ￿ as well as provide more information on the discrepancy between the observed
wage and an endogenous wage solution implied by the model. For the rest of the parame-
ters unrelated to wage setting mechanism, however, both approaches must be equivalent
(assuming that wage setting in the second approach is correctly speci￿ed).
￿ Identi￿cation
The set of model parameters to estimate comprises ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿￿, ￿￿, ￿￿ and f￿k;pkgK
k=1.
As just mentioned, bargaining power parameter ￿ drops out as we use the household survey
data only. Furthermore, we keep the rate of time preference ￿ ￿xed.20
Identi￿cation of the model parameters comes from di⁄erent sources. From (24d) and
(26b) we can see that separation rate parameters ￿￿ and the distribution of the unobserved
component f￿k;pkgK
k=1 in ￿(x;￿k) = expfx0￿￿ + ￿kg, 8k, are always identi￿ed from the
data on the job duration l and observed individual characteristics x: This holds as the
distribution of job duration is simply a ￿nite mixture of exponential distributions which is
known to be identi￿able. Since x contains an intercept, the ￿rst mass point in the distribution
of unobserved component is normalized to zero (i.e. ￿1 = 0). Finally, since fpkgK
k=1 is a
probability mass function, we set pK = 1 ￿ ￿
K￿1
k=1 pk.
Next we demonstrate identi￿ability of ￿0, ￿ and ￿ in a model where ￿0 is a single para-
meter. To do so, we need to consider the endpoint condition that pins down the path of the
optimal exit rate at in￿nity. This condition is shown in equation (A.9) in app. A.3 and cor-
responds to the exit rate in a completely stationary environment, where the two-step system
and the exogenous spell-e⁄ect have no impact anymore. From equation (A.9) we see that ￿
is identi￿ed through the variation in the bene￿t level. For a ￿xed rate of time preference,
conditioning on ￿, the middle term in this equation further suggests that variation in the
value of employment, which itself stems from the variation in wages and bene￿ts, will iden-
tify ￿ and ￿0 up to scaling, even if ￿ is a constant. From this follows that in the the solution
for the exit rate ￿UA the unemployment duration, wage and bene￿t data will identify ￿0, ￿
and ￿. As ￿0 is identi￿ed from the endpoint condition and f￿kgK
k=1 are identi￿ed from the
data on the employment duration, the parameters ￿￿ in ￿0 (x;￿k) = expfx0￿￿ + ￿￿￿kg, 8k,
are always identi￿ed from the observed individual characteristics x for a given ￿￿. Let us for
the moment suggest that ￿￿ is known and return to identi￿cation of this parameter later on.
20We set ￿ to 0:002, which corresponds to an annual interest rate of 2:4%.
18Once the endpoint condition is identi￿ed, identi￿cation of the exogenous spell-e⁄ect
comes from the optimal solution for the time path of the exit rate ￿j (s) itself. This path is
shown in equation (A.8) in app. A.3. From the second term in this equation, we see that the
spell-e⁄ect will always be identi￿ed as long as _ ￿ (s)=￿ (s) remains a time-dependent function,
which is true for our speci￿cation. Identi￿cation of the particular parameters in g (s) will
depend on its parametric form. With our speci￿cation in (25), ￿ is always identi￿ed being
just a single parameter.
Finally, the fraction ￿ of those who pass the means test is always identi￿ed at least by
observability of the outcome of the means test in the two particular subsamples of our indi-
viduals. The ￿rst subsample contains all individuals who fail to exit unemployment before
the entitlement period is over and transit to a lower-bene￿t regime. The second subsample
comprises all those who have no entitlement to UI bene￿ts from the very beginning. In both
of these subsamples, the outcome of means test is observable as can be seen from (24b) and
(24c), respectively.
Returning to the coe¢ cient ￿￿ that multiplies the unobserved component ￿ in ￿0 (x;￿),
its identi￿cation in practice is less clear. This parameter should be identi￿ed from the unob-
served component ￿ just by the data on unemployment duration that insure the appropriate
scaling of ￿ in ￿0 (x;￿). However, all our attempts to ￿t the model keeping ￿￿ as a free para-
meter were permanently plagued by very poor convergence and unreliable Hessian matrices
evaluated at the maximizer. This has ￿nally made us setting ￿￿ to zero. Despite setting this
parameter to zero the in￿ uence of unobserved component on the exit rate out of unemploy-
ment is still preserved, because this exit rate, as seen in (23), is a function of the optimal
search e⁄ort and the optimal e⁄ort is determined by ￿(x;￿). Thus, the exit rate retains the
conditioning on ￿ and the mixture model (26a) is still valid for all three types of unemployed
workers. This makes us believe that setting ￿￿ to zero is not restrictive.
4.3 Estimation results
Table 1 below reports estimation results for three speci￿cations. Speci￿cation I does not
condition on the observed and unobserved individual characteristics, speci￿cation II con-
ditions only on the observed characteristics, and speci￿cation III takes into account both
observed and unobserved components. All speci￿cations make provision for unobservability
of the results of the means test.
Numerical complexity of the model makes us restrict attention on only a selected number
of key characteristics, which are sex (=1 if male), region (=1 if an individual comes from East
Germany), two education dummies: medium-skilled (=1 if middle vocational education) and
high-skilled (=1 if higher vocational or higher education), and two age dummies that de￿ne
the groups of workers up to 30 years old and 31 to 45 years old.
As for the estimation results per se, our main ￿nding is the signi￿cance of ￿. This
means that changes in the optimal e⁄ort levels in response to any unemployment bene￿t
reform, be it the reform of bUI;UA or of ￿ s, will have a signi￿cant impact on the exit rate
out of unemployment. As e⁄ort is a function of unemployment bene￿ts via the ￿rst-order
condition (8), this ￿nding in particular contributes to the empirical reduced form literature
that analyses the dependence between unemployment bene￿ts and the probability of leaving
19(I) (II) (III)
Coe⁄. SE z-Stat. p-Value Coe⁄. SE z-Stat. p-Value Coe⁄. SE z-Stat. p-Value
￿￿: intercept ￿4:4976 0:0563 ￿79:9007 0:0000 ￿4:4567 0:1805 ￿24:6865 0:0000 ￿5:6674 0:4370 ￿12:9688 0:0000
sex 0:5403 0:1186 4:5552 0:0000 0:7117 0:1802 3:9494 0:0001
region 0:8707 0:1140 7:6370 0:0000 1:1316 0:2054 5:5103 0:0000
medium-skilled ￿0:3855 0:1513 ￿2:5480 0:0108 ￿0:5102 0:2324 ￿2:1956 0:0281
high-skilled ￿0:7512 0:1889 ￿3:9773 0:0001 ￿0:8449 0:2594 ￿3:2566 0:0011
age (up to 30) ￿0:3134 0:1556 ￿2:0139 0:0440 ￿0:1687 0:2460 ￿0:6858 0:4928
age (31 to 45) ￿0:4102 0:1548 ￿2:6500 0:0080 ￿0:2583 0:2425 ￿1:0654 0:2867
￿￿: intercept ￿3:5421 0:5414 ￿6:5427 0:0000 ￿3:8200 0:3455 ￿11:0553 0:0000 ￿4:0233 0:4737 ￿8:4936 0:0000
sex 0:0650 0:1301 0:5000 0:6171 0:0897 0:1245 0:7206 0:4712
region ￿0:0201 0:1310 ￿0:1531 0:8783 0:0777 0:1395 0:5571 0:5774
medium-skilled 0:2832 0:1627 1:7408 0:0817 0:2298 0:1737 1:3230 0:1858
high-skilled 0:4758 0:2115 2:2499 0:0245 0:3937 0:2185 1:8016 0:0716
age (up to 30) 0:7751 0:1726 4:4901 0:0000 0:7872 0:1711 4:6002 0:0000
age (31 to 45) 0:6647 0:1581 4:2053 0:0000 0:6597 0:1616 4:0812 0:0000
￿ 0:4945 0:0783 6:3122 0:0000 0:4102 0:0762 5:3848 0:0000 0:4562 0:0750 6:0836 0:0000
￿ 0:6538 0:1253 5:2196 0:0000 0:7748 0:1010 7:6678 0:0000 0:7022 0:1367 5:1378 0:0000
￿ 11:8035 1:7599 6:7067 0:0000 14:5479 2:9778 4:8855 0:0000 14:8408 3:0935 4:7975 0:0000
￿ 0:2462 0:0297 8:2840 0:0000 0:2448 0:0294 8:3331 0:0000 0:2450 0:0295 8:3182 0:0000
￿ 2:4717 0:1798 13:7493 0:0000
p 0:6404 0:0753 8:5083 0:0000
logL ￿2920:36 ￿2853:94 ￿2819:37
Table 1 Estimation resultsunemployment. Evidence on this dependence are somewhat con￿ icting. Early work by
Hujer and Schneider (1989) and Arulampalam and Stewart (1995) ￿nds mostly no signi￿cant
in￿ uence of bene￿ts while later work by Carling et al. (2001) and Rłed and Zhang (2003)
state the opposite.21 For German data, Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects
of a reduction both of the level of bene￿ts and of the entitlement length, the latter is visible
only, however, for original entitlements above 12 months. Our entirely structural perspective
provides an alternative view. While we do not rule out that for certain types of heterogeneous
agents changing bene￿ts may play no role, our result on the signi￿cance of ￿ shows that
in su¢ ciently aggregate terms there exists a positive signi￿cant relationship between the
reemployment probability and a change in the level of unemployment bene￿t payments.
Consequently, a change in the design of the unemployment bene￿t mechanism will induce a
signi￿cant response on the macro level.
Our next important ￿nding is on the role of unobserved heterogeneity. As for hetero-
geneity with respect to the outcome of the means test, tab. 1 shows that ￿ is always di⁄erent
from zero and unity at 5% signi￿cance level. Together with the signi￿cance of ￿; this implies
that the prospect of not passing the means test signi￿cantly increases search e⁄ort and exit
probability. Moreover, looking at the results of speci￿cation III, we ￿nd that heterogene-
ity with respect to further unobserved characteristics also has an impact.22 Our estimates
show a two-point distribution of the unobserved component with the probability mass value
p di⁄erent from both zero and unity at 5% level. Along with the statistically signi￿cant
estimate of the mass point, this shows a signi￿cant improvement of speci￿cation III over the
speci￿cation II.
The importance of unmeasured heterogeneity is frequently highlighted in the literature
on the structural estimation of search models. Much fewer attempts have been made to
explicitly address the exogenous spell dependence within this framework. Since our model is
nonstationary from the very beginning, accounting for such spell-dependence is particularly
easy. Tab. 1 shows that the estimate of ￿ is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. However,
absence of exogenous spell dependence is not nested in our model, because (25) does not
include time-invariance as a special case. Therefore the appropriate test for exogenous spell-
dependence is the Vuong (1989) likelihood ratio test for model selection where spell-e⁄ect
in the competing model is absent, i.e. ￿ (s;x;￿) = ￿0 (x;￿).23 Performing this test for the
richest speci￿cation, which is speci￿cation III, it turns out that the null hypothesis of the
equivalence of these two models is clearly rejected in favour of the model with the spell-e⁄ect.
This means that once key observed and unobserved components are accounted for, there still
remains a signi￿cant degree of downward state dependence among long-term unemployed.
21To be fair, the analyses are undertaken for di⁄erent countries. Moreover, later studies, notably Rłed and
Zhang (2003), provide more sophisticated treatment of unobserved heterogeneity in comparison to earlier
ones.
22The estimated number of mass points in the distribution of the unobserved component is equal to two
(K = 2). Adding the third mass point would always make us converge to any of the estimated two. With
￿1 = 0 and p2 = 1 ￿ p1; the estimates shown in tab. 1 are the estimates of ￿2 and p1. As there is no
ambiguity, subscripts are omitted.
23This is the test for strictly non-nested models as both models have no conditional distribution in common
(see Vuong, 1989, De￿nition 2). The appropriate test statistic is given in Vuong (1989), Theorem 5.1. We
use the Schwarz correction factor to adjust for the di⁄erence in the number of parameters in the competing
models (see Vuong, 1989, p.318). The calculated value of the adjusted test statistic is 57:13. Asymptotic
distribution of the test statistic is standard normal.
21Coexistence of unobserved heterogeneity and duration dependence aligns with the similar
￿nding of van den Berg and van Ours (1996, 1999), who use an entirely di⁄erent modelling
approach.
Finally, our estimate of the utility parameter ￿ is also very comforting. First, the degree of
risk aversion is high enough to reject the hypothesis of risk neutrality. Second, signi￿cance
of ￿ provides the empirical evidence on the existence of a signi￿cant insurance e⁄ect of
unemployment bene￿ts.
Regarding the ￿t of the model, tab. 1 clearly shows an improvement from speci￿cation
I to speci￿cation III, the latter being the best of all three. To illustrate the ￿t of our
best speci￿cation for each of the four di⁄erent subsamples (East Germany, West Germany,
males and females), we predict the survivor function and plot it against the Kaplan-Meier
nonparametric estimate of the survival probability in unemployment. These plots can be
seen in app. A.4, ￿g. 7. We ￿nd that with the exception of the 3rd and 4th months of
unemployment duration, where model predictions tend to lie outside the 95% con￿dence
interval for the Kaplan-Meier estimate, our model provides quite an accurate ￿t to the
data. This assures that all our simulations based on the estimated parameters will be well-
grounded.
After having estimated all the parameters, we are left with determining labour produc-
tivity A and vacancy cost ￿. The wage w and tightness ￿ were taken as exogenous in this
￿rst part of the estimation which was built on the household side of the model only. As the
wage and tightness are endogenous in equilibrium, we now take the estimated parameters
and compute parameters A and ￿ using the full equilibrium structure of our economy in the
steady state (see app. B.2.2). We compute A and ￿ such that the equilibrium endogenous
variables w and ￿ equalize with the average wage and labour market tightness from our data.
See tab. 2 for results.
5 Evaluating the labour market reform
We now use the structurally estimated parameters in order to describe the steady state
equilibrium of 2004 and to evaluate the reform e⁄ective as of January 2005.
5.1 The pre-reform steady state
Data is heterogeneous in many respects and we have vectors of bUI;i; bUA;i; ￿ si and the wage
wi. Building on the mean wage (used above e.g. to predict A and ￿), UI payments for our
representative agent are determined by ￿UI as in (2). Quantitatively, the replacement rate
is given by ￿UI = !￿UI where ￿UI is the statutory replacement rate and ! is the share of
individuals who are entitled to UI payments. As only an estimated share of ￿ = 24:4%
pass the means test (see tab. 1), UA payments for our representative agent are computed
as the product of the statutory replacement rate ￿UA, the previous wage and the share ￿,
bUA = ￿￿UAw. Average sample entitlement to UI payments is ￿ s = 12:22 months, again for
those entitled to UI payments. With these means for bUA and ￿ s, our representative agent
receives the same amount of bene￿ts at each point in time s as the mean in the data over
a cohort of unemployed who all have an unemployment spell of s (see app. B.4.1). By
22representative we understand the average individual in our data set in 2004 (for descriptive
statistics of individual characteristics in 2004 see tab. 3 in app. A.1).
All parameters used in this paper, apart from the ones presented in speci￿cation III of
tab. 1, plus some selected endogenous variables are provided in tab. 2.24 As in the estimation
part, the time preference rate is chosen to ￿t an annual interest rate of 2:4%: The bargaining
power ￿ is set equal to :5: (Increasing the time preference rate to 3% or 4% or changing ￿
to :3 or :7 in robustness checks had basically no e⁄ects.) We use speci￿cation III to from
tab. 1 to predict the average separation rate ￿ and the parameter ￿0 in (22) and (23) for the
spell-e⁄ect. The corresponding separation rate ￿, ￿0 and the implied mean exit rate ￿ ￿ can










￿UI ￿UA ￿ s !
.6 .53 12.22 .56
equilibrium values
w ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (N ￿ L)=N
1172.6e .20 2.4% 0.11 8.7%
Table 2 Parameters and selected equilibrium values
Our equilibrium values ￿t perfectly by construction for the wage and labour market
tightness. Our tax rate ￿ is su¢ ciently close to the actual social security contribution
rate (this is the only purpose of taxes in our model). The average matching rate of 0:11
means that the probability to lose a job per month (as we use monthly data) is given by
e￿￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿ 1 = 9:8%; which is reasonable as well. The only quantity which does not match
aggregate statistics at ￿rst sight is the unemployment rate. While it is estimated at 8:7%
in our model using micro-data, the o¢ cial aggregate number is 10:5% (Bundesagentur f￿r
Arbeit, 2009). This is mainly caused by the di⁄erent datasources used for our estimation
and for o¢ cial unemployment rates. We do not consider this to be a major problem as our
main interest lies in understanding the change of the unemployment rate after the reform
and not in its level and as the o¢ cial unemployment rate lies within the 95% con￿dence
interval of our estimated 8:7%.
For comparative statics below, we will take the exogenous parameters, the estimated and
the predicted parameters and the replacement rate for short-term unemployed ￿UI as given.
We will then change long-term bene￿ts bUA and the entitlement period ￿ s to understand the
e⁄ects on equilibrium values.
Although the economy is in the steady state, there are still dynamics on the micro level
as illustrated in ￿g. 2. At any point in time, individuals ￿nd and lose jobs. The upper left
panel shows that the estimated exogenous spell-e⁄ect from (21) with (25) falls over time.
The value of being unemployed thereby unambiguously falls over time. This is shown by the
upper right panel and needs to hold generally as (A.2) in the appendix shows. The intuition
24See app. A.2 for a description of the numerical solution procedure.































Figure 2 The spell e⁄ect ￿ (s), the value of being unemployed V (b(s);s); e⁄ort ￿(s) and
the exit rate ￿(b(s);s) (￿￿￿ bUA as in model, ￿ bUA = 0; ￿ ￿ bUA = bUI) as a function of
the spell s (in months)
is simple: If there was no spell-e⁄ect (￿ (s) is constant), a long-term unemployed would
live in a stationary world and the value of being a long-term unemployed worker would be
stationary as well. With a negative spell-e⁄ect, the job ￿nding rate - taking optimally chosen
e⁄ort into account - goes down and the value of being unemployed approaches a lower limit
determined by the lower limit of ￿ (s). In both cases, the value of a short-term unemployed
worker falls as the point in time where lower UA bene￿ts are paid comes closer over time.
The optimal reaction of the unemployed worker is shown by the lower left panel. E⁄ort
increases during the ￿rst 12 months and then starts falling when entitlement to unemploy-
ment insurance ceases at ￿ s = 12:2 months. Note that optimal e⁄ort could rise longer or fall
earlier than at ￿ s as it is the outcome of the interplay of the spell-e⁄ect (lower ￿ (s) reduces
optimal e⁄ort) and the incentive-e⁄ect, i.e. the potential gain from ￿nding a job. As gains
increase due to a falling value of being unemployed, this second e⁄ect tends to increase e⁄ort.
This can be seen from the ￿rst-order condition in (8) or, more directly, from (A.1) in the
appendix. The initial increase of e⁄ort clearly re￿ ects the rising incentive to search harder
the closer ￿ s approaches. For our estimation, after around 12 months, the increase in the gain
of ￿nding a job is no longer strong enough to compensate the ￿discouraging￿spell-e⁄ect.
Search e⁄ort falls and approaches a constant. The fact that unemployed workers ￿nally ￿give
up￿is ultimately the e⁄ect of the exogenous negative spell-e⁄ect.
The lower right panel shows exit rates for bUA = 0 (solid), average bUA (dotted) and
bUA = bUI (dashed). Exit rates mirror e⁄ort dynamics conditional on the bene￿t level for
s > ￿ s. The case of bUA = bUI does not provide any incentives to search harder over time. The
exit probability is the lowest, being driven only by the spell-e⁄ect. The wider the gap between
bUA and bUI; the less attractive is unemployment relative to employment. This implies higher
24upward pressure due to increased search e⁄ort and translates into a steeper increase of the
exit rate out of unemployment. Exit rates are steepest and highest for bUA = 0.
5.2 The e⁄ects of the reform
The reform was characterized by a reduction in UA bene￿ts bUA (which are given levels
after the reform and no longer proportional to the previous wage) and entitlement length
￿ s. Bene￿ts decreased on average by 7%; average entitlement length dropped from 12:2 to
10:9 months, i.e. by 10:7%: We present here the e⁄ect of the reform, i.e. a joint decrease of
both bUA and ￿ s: The replacement rate ￿UI remains unchanged and UI payments are paid
according to (2).
The horizontal axis of ￿g. 3 plots ￿Hartz-units￿ . The ￿1￿represents the situation before
the reform. The ￿0￿represents the situation after the reform and ￿-1￿to ￿-4￿shows the
e⁄ects of a stronger reform, i.e. of reducing bUA by another 7% and ￿ s by another 10:7%. The
vertical axes plot changes relative to the pre-reform steady state which is normalized (for
levels, see tab. 2) to 1. The pre-reform steady state is therefore always given by the point
(1;1): The solid line shows the changes as predicted by our estimated model. The dashed
lines above and below provide a 95% con￿dence interval for the statistic in the middle. This
con￿dence interval is constructed using parametric bootstrap where draws are made from
the multivariate normal distribution of the maximum likelihood estimates. For every new
draw we recompute the equilibrium solution at each Hartz-unit. Due to the high numerical
complexity of the equilibrium solution, con￿dence intervals at each Hartz-unit are based on
160 replications.25
Generally speaking, we ￿nd very weak e⁄ects of the reform. The qualitative e⁄ects of
the reform are as intended by policy makers. E⁄ort ￿(0) when becoming unemployed rises
the stronger the reform is, i.e. the further we are to the left of the upper left panel of
￿g. 3. Labour market tightness ￿ and the average job ￿nding rate ￿ ￿ from (11) rise as well.
The increase in ￿; i.e. the number of vacancies per unemployed worker, is crucial for our
interpretation further below. Understanding this e⁄ect is simple, however: More e⁄ort by
unemployed workers makes opening a vacancy more attractive. Hence, lower bene￿ts induce
a higher number of vacancies per unemployed worker. The quantitatively weak e⁄ect of the
reform becomes visible when looking at the unemployment rate. It decreases from the pre-
reform steady state ￿1￿to the reform level at ￿0￿to (slightly more than) 97% only. Starting
at an unemployment rate of around 10:5%, the e⁄ect of the reform would be to decrease the
unemployment rate to 10:2%, i.e. by just 0:3 percentage points.
The lower left panel shows that the tax rate falls. This has the following reasons: Lower
bene￿t payments and a lower number of recipients reduce overall expenditure. This reduced
expenditure is paid by more workers who earn higher gross wages.
One of the most surprising results is the increase in the net and gross wage. This increase
is also the basis for the rise in social welfare which we will discuss later. The increase in the net
wages becomes clear from the wage equation (13) when taking into account that the positive
tightness e⁄ect dominates the negative e⁄ort e⁄ect. This is an interesting feature of this wage
bargaining setup with endogenous e⁄ort and is in strong contrast to perfectly competitive
25To the best of our knowledge, we are the ￿rst to explicitly show con￿dence intervalls for our policy
analysis - even though it turns out that not all reform-induced changes are signi￿cant.
25setups, to bargaining setups with exogenous e⁄ort and to search setups where the reservation
wage is a simple decreasing function of the outside option. Here, the outside option (utility
from being an unemployed worker) decreases as well but this is overcompensated, given our
estimates, by the positive e⁄ect of more vacancies per unemployed worker.
































































Figure 3 Aggregate e⁄ects of UA payments bUA and entitlement length ￿ s
Con￿dence intervals for all the statistics in ￿g. 3 show that the changes induced by the
reform are statistically signi￿cant, as both the upper and the lower bound lie strictly above
(or strictly below) unity. Summarizing and ignoring distributional e⁄ects, the reform has
the qualitatively desired e⁄ects but is quantitatively of hardly any importance: While the
reduction of unemployment is statistically signi￿cant, economically, it is not.
When we look at welfare measures in ￿g. 4, we see the distributional nature of the reform.
Employed workers gain from the reform. This might not appear surprising given that the
net wage rises. Employed workers do also anticipate, however, the potential loss from the
reform as they have a certain risk of becoming unemployed. If the value of being unemployed
falls, the value of having a job could fall as well.
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Figure 4 Distributional e⁄ects of UA payments bUA and entitlement length ￿ s
When we look at the value of being unemployed at s = 0; i.e. right after having lost
the job, this value slightly increases as well due to the reform. This is entirely due to the
anticipation e⁄ect of having a job. The short-term unemployed clearly loses as bene￿ts
will fall earlier and by more due to the reform. But a short-term unemployed worker also
gains in an expected intertemporal sense as she will gain more due to the reform in case
she ￿nds a job. More formally, the value of unemployment depends negatively on search
e⁄ort and positively on exit rate, which can be seen from equations (7) and (20). As both
search e⁄ort and the exit rate go up, each e⁄ect could dominate. In our case, the positive
exit-rate e⁄ect is the stronger one for the short-term unemployed. Our most stunning result
is that even the long-term unemployed workers gain when we de￿ne long-term as those with
an unemployment spell of 12 months. Looking at unemployed workers with a spell of two
or three years, we also ￿nd that they still gain. Looking at the reason analytically (see
app. B.4.2) con￿rms the intuition: The rise in the wage is so large that any temporary drop
in consumption is overcompensated by expected future consumption.
Considering the 95% con￿dence intervals for each of these three statistics, though, we can
see that despite the predicted wins and losses, all these wins and losses are not statistically
signi￿cant. The con￿dence bounds lie above and below unity. What is signi￿cant, however,
are the losses of the ￿rms, i.e. a drop of J when bene￿ts bUA are reduced.
27The loss of ￿rms is also a surprising qualitative result of our analysis and is a direct
consequence of the rise in the gross wage. Rewriting (10) slightly shows that the value of
the ￿rm J decreases in the gross wage, hence ￿rms dislike the reform. Is this a strong
disadvantage of our model given that employers generally were in favour of the reform in
public discussions? We do not think so. The wage can rise or fall in our theoretical setup.
Whether the worse outside option of employed workers reduces the wage more than the higher
job-￿nding rate due to higher ￿ is theoretically an open question. Given our estimates, the ￿￿-
e⁄ect￿dominates. While ￿rms urged the unemployed to search harder and the government
to pay them lower bene￿ts, they might not have seen the equilibrium e⁄ect that higher
vacancies per unemployed worker ￿nally makes workers stronger, wages rise and pro￿ts fall.
Given that both employed, short-term and long-term unemployed workers gain, it is then
not surprising - despite the lack of statistical signi￿cance - that overall welfare as measured
in (15) increases.
5.3 Understanding the e⁄ects of the reform
Generally speaking, we ￿nd very weak e⁄ects of the reform. This can be made plausible
with a back-of-the-envelope calculation. As the unemployment rate is approx. 10% and
only 1/3 becomes long-term unemployed, only 3.3% of the entire labour force are a⁄ected.
Of these 3.3% only ￿ = 24:5% pass the means test. In an intertemporal sense, income of
the representative household is reduced only during 24:5% ￿ 3:3% ￿ 1% of ones￿lifetime.
The duration of unemployment insurance payments is reduced by 10:7%; the level of the
payments by 7%: Let this add up - to make this simple and high - to 18%. If 1% of lifetime
income is reduced by 18%, overall lifetime income reduces by 1%￿18% ￿ 0:2%. No surprise
that quantitative e⁄ects are weak.
It is often argued that unemployment falls when there is economics growth. What is
the contribution of growth to the reduction in unemployment in our setup? Real GDP in
Germany grew by 0:8%; 3:0% and 2:5% in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively, i.e. by 6:4%
over these three years. TFP grew by 4:0% (Ameco, 2010) in the same period and (annual
averages of) unemployment in Germany fell from 10:5% to 9:0%. When the growth e⁄ect
is taken into account by letting output A of a worker-￿rm match increase by 4:0% when
evaluating the e⁄ects of the reform, the unemployment rate falls to 93:1% of its initial level
(instead of 96:8% without TFP growth), as shown on the left-hand side of ￿g. 5. If we
attribute the reduction to 96:8% to the reform and the remaining reduction (amounting to
96:8% ￿ 93:1% = 3:7%) to economic growth, economic growth was slightly more successful
in reducing unemployment than the reform.
The most surprising result of our analysis is that workers as a whole gain. This is surpris-
ing as one would expect that the insurance mechanism of unemployment bene￿t payments
is reduced following the reduction in bUA: Remember that in a world without moral hazard,
unemployment bene￿ts should equal the net wage. Given that a reduction in the length
￿ s and the level bUA of unemployment bene￿ts moves our economy further away from this
setup, one should expect that the insurance mechanism is reduced. Why is it then that
social welfare increases?
To understand this, we divide the e⁄ects of the reform into two partial e⁄ects. The
￿rst partial e⁄ect is the insurance e⁄ect, i.e. the e⁄ect of the reform on social welfare when
28the gross wage is being held constant. What would happen if a reduction in bUA implies
a reduction in the tax ￿ and thereby an increase in the net wage w? The result of this
thought-experiment is given in the right panel of ￿g. 5.
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Figure 5 The e⁄ect of economic growth on the change of the unemployment rate (left panel)
and the pure insurance e⁄ect of the reform for short-term unemployed workers (right panel)
The horizontal axis plots the same Hartz-steps as in previous ￿gures. We see (dashed
line) that expected utility falls for a worker who just lost the job (s = 0) when e⁄ort is the
same as in the pre-reform steady state (as in the lower left panel of ￿g. 2). The path of
e⁄ort is therefore invariant to changes in bene￿t levels. This clearly re￿ ects the fact that
in a world with non-responding e⁄ort, unemployment bene￿ts should equal the net wage.
Any departure from this equality reduces expected utility. The same result holds when we
allow e⁄ort to be a function of bene￿ts, i.e. we allow incentives of the reform to play a role.
The ￿gure shows (solid line) that welfare decreases less (as incentives are now improved)
but welfare still falls. The same qualitative ￿gure holds for an employed worker and for
unemployed workers for any s:
As we know that welfare rises in equilibrium, we can conclude that all bene￿cial e⁄ects of
the reform come from the second partial e⁄ect, i.e. the increase in the wage due to the higher
number of vacancies per unemployed worker. This stresses the importance of two points:
Academically speaking, an evaluation of labour market reforms should be undertaken in an
equilibrium setup to provide a complete picture of the e⁄ects. More importantly, the reform
decreased the insurance mechanism implied by unemployment bene￿ts but - in the end -
this was bene￿cial to the average worker.
One argument against our analysis would state that real hourly wages in Germany fell
from 2004 onwards (see e.g. Brenke, 2009, ￿g. 2). While we admit this fact, it apparently
must be caused by factors other than the reform which we analyze here. In order to check
our statement, look at ￿; the ratio of vacancies to the number of unemployed 3 years before
and after the reform. According to ￿g. 3, it rises due to the reform.






Figure 6 Monthly vacancies per unemployed worker three years before and after the reform
(Bundesagentur f￿r Arbeit, 2010)
As ￿g. 6 shows, vacancies per unemployed workers indeed increased after the reform, as
predicted by our model.26 Concerning wages, we conclude that there must have been some
other factor independent of the reform which caused wages to decline. Hours worked - having
increased by more than 4% between 2005 and 2007 - is one of the candidates.
6 Conclusion
Our project started by inquiring about the e⁄ects of the Hartz IV labour market reform on
incentives and insurance mechanisms for the workforce. At the macro level, we investigate
the e⁄ects on the unemployment rate and social welfare. We have developed an estimable
search and matching model with endogenous e⁄ort under time-dependent unemployment
bene￿ts. The main extension compared to the existing search and matching literature is the
endogenous distribution of unemployment duration that arises due to individual choice of
search intensity in a nonstationary environment. A link between these micro-dynamics and
macro quantities like the unemployment rate was developed using tools from the literature
on Semi-Markov processes. The theoretical model provides the density of unemployment
duration of an individual being a function of various model parameters. This density provides
the basis for structural estimation via maximum likelihood. Equilibrium policy analyses were
performed using the parameter estimates of the best ￿tting speci￿cation.
We ￿nd that the unemployment rate did decrease due to the reform. Unemployed workers
have stronger incentives to search hard. The reduction of the unemployment rate was quan-
titatively very small, however. While statistically signi￿cant, the reduction amounts to 0.3%
only. Concerning distributional e⁄ects, we ￿nd that employed workers and the short-term
unemployed win. These results are not statistically signi￿cant, however. We also ￿nd - much
to our own surprise and in contrast to the perception of the public - that even long-term
26We admit that the quantitative increase in the data is much larger than predicted by our model. We
leave estimation of parameters using both micro and macro data for future research.
30unemployed workers win. Social welfare therefore increases! According to this setup, labour
market reforms of this type are Pareto-improving.
Looking into the mechanisms in more detail, we ￿nd that the gain in social welfare is not
due to an improvement in the insurance mechanism. Keeping the gross wage constant, the
Hartz IV reform clearly reduced expected utility of a worker. As the reform did have equi-
librium e⁄ects as well which made the wage increase, expected utility of a worker increased.
Summarizing, while workers need to search harder, this higher search e⁄ort induces ￿rms
to open new vacancies. Firms open so many of them that the net and gross wage, overall
utility for workers and social welfare increases.
These ￿ndings clearly give rise to new research questions of which one of the more pressing
ones concerns the issue of ex-ante identical individuals. What if we had ex-ante heterogeneity
in skill levels? One would expect that social welfare gains would not be as large. Long-term
unemployed close to retirement age or with little educational background have low exit rates
out of unemployment and they might lose from such a reform. Heterogeneity in separation
rates could also be taken into account. With ex-ante heterogeneity, could a reform still be
designed such that it is Pareto-improving? Further, how robust are the ￿ndings if individuals
were allowed to self-insure through savings? Consumption drops would be smoother and
welfare gains could be even larger than what was found here. If, however, low-income groups
hardly hold any wealth, this would not be true for this group. Finally and maybe most
importantly, the wage setting mechanism needs more empirical investigation. Given that
our results are driven by the positive wage e⁄ect, one should inquire into the empirical
plausibility of this channel. This can be done by using matched employer-employee data
with reliable ￿rm productivity measures and by adding macro channels which might also
in￿ uence wage setting. Exploring this in more detail is left for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Data
The data comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a panel
surveying households on an annual basis. The survey is coordinated by the Deutsche Institut
f￿r Wirtschaftsforschung (Berlin, see www.gsoep.de).
We draw a ￿ ow sample of entrants to employment and unemployment at each month of
years 1997-98. The choice of the year of sampling is determined by the fact that no changes
to either bene￿t levels or the entitlement length were made between the 1 January 1997
and 1 January 2005, when the Hartz IV reform was implemented. With December 2004
being the latest month of our observation period, we end up with a sample that describes
a stationary entitlement-bene￿t environment and provides a fairly reliable information on
long-term unemployment (only 9.12% of unemployment durations in our sample are right-
censored). For each entrant we retrieve the duration of stay in the current state since the
moment of entry. Following van den Berg and Ridder (1998, p.1194), we exclude individuals
with transitions to states other than full-time employment and unemployment.
Units of measurement are months for the duration data and real EUR (based on 2004) for
the wage and bene￿ts data. Wage is the average monthly wage for the months of employment
within a year prior to job loss, as these are the wage bases that conform with the observed
31bene￿t levels. Descriptive statistics can be found in tab. 3.
Unemployment Employment Sample characteristics
Mean StD Mean StD Mean StD
Duration (s) 8.81 13.16 Duration (l), Males 0.5380 0.4988
UI bene￿ts (bUI) 727.46 294.94 censored 57.55 25.73 East Germans 0.4227 0.4942
Entitlement (￿ s) 12.18 5.48 Duration (l), Medium-skill 0.5961 0.4909
Wage (w) 1166.26 538.07 all sample 40.68 30.13 High-skill 0.2090 0.4068
Share of entitled Age up to 30 0.3843 0.4866
to UI (!) 0.5657 0.4963 obs: total/cens. 694 / 392 Age 31 to 45 0.4264 0.4948
Share of ￿ s = 12
among entitled 0.4882 0.5010 obs: total 1067
Observed share of
passing the test 0.2850 0.4525
obs: total/cens. 373 / 34
Table 3 Descriptive statistics (months and EUR)
GSOEP does not contain information on the length of entitlement to UI bene￿ts. Using
statutory rules, however, allows computing the length of entitlement once we know the length
of previous job durations and the age of an individual (see e.g. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/54/
29730499.pdf). For this reason, for every person that enters unemployment we also have to
retrieve her previous job history. In addition to that, previous job history provides us with




East Germans 0.3848 0.4870
Medium-skill 0.5109 0.5004
High-skill 0.2565 0.4372
Age up to 30 0.3413 0.4747
Age 31 to 45 0.4152 0.4933
obs: total 460
Table 4 Descriptive statistics: Individual characteristics in 2004
The mean of the vacancy-unemployment ratio ￿ between 1997 and 1999 in Germany is
0:24 (data of the Institute for Employment Research, IAB, adjusted for underreporting). In
the estimation we use a common measure for ￿ refraining from the variation across local
labour markets. The reason is that making use of such variation will require introduction of
32market-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects to separate the tightness e⁄ect from the rest of the local-market
conditions. This will render the estimation computationally unfeasible.
Finally, in the predictions for the pre-reform steady state we use the average observed
characteristics of the individuals sampled immediately before the reform, i.e. in 2004. For
that we similarly draw a ￿ ow sample with entry between 01.2004-12.2004 and record personal
characteristics. Descriptive statistics for these characteristics are shown in tab. 4.
A.2 Steady state solution
We solve for the steady state of the model by separating the model into two ￿blocks￿ .
Block 1 describes the behaviour of households. Given the functional forms for utility and
the spell-e⁄ect in (20) and (22), the ￿rst-order condition for e⁄ort (8) reads
￿(s) = f￿￿ (s)￿
￿ [V (w) ￿ V (b(s);s)]g
1
1￿￿ . (A.1)
It holds for both short- and long-term unemployed. Plugging this into the Bellman equation
for the unemployed (7), using (22) and expressing it as a di⁄erential equation in s gives (see
app. B.2.1)














which is again valid for both short- and long-term unemployed. As the value of being
unemployed an instant before and an instant after becoming a long-term unemployed is
identical, we impose V (bUI; ￿ s) = V (bUA; ￿ s) from (9) when solving this di⁄erential equation.
Finally, since for an in￿nite unemployment spell, the spell-e⁄ect in (21) with (25) becomes
a constant, lim
s!1￿(s) = ￿0 and all other quantities are stationary as well, we get the terminal
condition for (A.2) by using lim
s!1












1￿￿ [V (w) ￿ V (bUA)]
1
1￿￿ : (A.3)











Now imagine we insert V (w) from (A.4) into (A.2) and (A.3). Imagine further that we
know all parameters and assume, for the time being, some values for w and ￿: Then we
can solve the di⁄erential equation (A.2) starting from some initial value V (bUI;0) and see
whether the solution for s ! 1 is identical to V (bUA) from (A.3). If it does not, we need
to adjust our initial guess V (bUI;0) until it does. Hence, with some exogenous w and ￿; we
have obtained the time path of e⁄ort over the unemployment spell, ￿(b(s);s), the spell-path
of the value of being unemployed, V (b(s);s); and the value of a job V (w).
Given the equilibrium values f￿(b(s);s);V (b(s);s);V (w)g as a function of w and ￿;
block 2 allows to endogenize w and ￿.








The bargaining equation (13) is copied here for convenience,








where mw (:) is from (14) and ￿(0) is the optimal search e⁄ort at the instant of entry into
unemployment, which is given from (A.1). Equations (A.5) and (A.6) use the average exit
rate ￿ ￿ and the tax rate ￿.
The average rate ￿ ￿ is given by (11) which can easily be computed given that, after having
solved block 1, the exit rates ￿(:) are known from (22) and the density f (s) can therefore
be computed from (4). The tax rate ￿ makes the government budget constraint (5) hold and
solves




Given the density f (s), one can compute the number of short-term and long-term un-
employed on the right-hand side of this expression from Ushort = (N ￿ L)
R ￿ s
0 f (s)ds and
Ulong = N ￿ L ￿ Ushort. The number of unemployed N ￿ L in turn follows from (19), using
(16a,b) and (17), given again that exit rates are known from block 1.
Hence, we are basically left with (A.5) and (A.6) to determine the missing endogenous
variables w and ￿: After having solved block 1 with a guess of w and ￿; we verify whether
this guess ful￿lls (A.5) and (A.6). If not, the guess is adjusted until a solution is found.
A.3 Transition rates to employment
Transition rates to employment are fully described by the optimal search e⁄ort. Using
￿rst order condition for search e⁄ort (8) and the de￿nition of the exit rate (22), we can
therefore express value of unemployment as a function of the optimal exit rate. Inserting this
value of unemployment into the Bellman equation for the unemployed (7) and expressing
it as a di⁄erential equation in s; we obtain the time path of the optimal exit transition
rate to employment as a result (see app. B.3.1 for a derivation). Omitting observed and
unobserved characteristics for brevity, the di⁄erential equation that describes the exit rate
out of unemployment both for the short-term and the long-term unemployed workers is






























where j = UI, UA as in (23). App. B.3.1 further shows that the relevant endpoint condition
for the second regime at s ! 1 is













+ ￿ = 0 (A.9)
34and that the condition for the ￿rst regime at s = ￿ s reads
￿UI (￿ s;bUI) = ￿UA (￿ s;bUA): (A.10)
Once wages and market tightness are observed from the data, V (w) can be obtained
from the solution to block 1 in app. A.2. Consequently, under the assumption that observed
w and ￿ are the direct results of the solution to block 2 in app. A.2, we can compute the
equilibrium exit rates out of unemployment without requiring employer-side data.
A.4 Estimated and predicted survivor functions
The following ￿gures show the predicted survivor functions (solid lines) for heterogeneous
population groups joint with the Kaplan-Meier survivor probabilities (circles). Correspond-
ing 95% con￿dence intervals are depicted by triangles. For a discussion, see towards the end
of sect. 4.3.
































Figure 7 Kaplan-Meier and predicted survivor functions
A.5 A Semi-Markov process
This section provides a short introduction into Semi-Markov processes. Technically, it fol-
lows Kulkarni (1995) and Corradi et al. (2004). The original work is by Pyke (1961a,b).
Due to their technical nature, these papers are less accessible and we hope that this ap-
pendix helps that these very useful methods become more widely used. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ￿rst application of these concepts in economics. For more details and
the numerical implementation, see Schumm (2010, ch. 4). The ￿rst subsection describes the
general approach to Semi-Markov processes while the second adapts it to our question.
35A.5.1 The general approach
Let Yn denote the state of a system after the nth transition. Let this state be i: Let the
point in time of the nth transition be denoted by Sn. De￿ne the probability that the system
after the next transition is in j and that this transition takes place within a period of length
x or shorter, conditional on the system being in i after the nth transition, as
Qij (x) ￿ P fYn+1 = j;Sn+1 ￿ Sn ￿ xjYn = ig:
The probability that any transition takes place is then given by summing up the probabilities
for each j, Qi (x) = ￿j6=iQij (x), not taking into account transitions from i to i.27 The
probability that the system will be in j in ￿ is given by
pij (￿) = (1 ￿ Qi (￿))￿ij + ￿k6=i
Z ￿
0
pkj (￿ ￿ x)dQik (x): (A.11)
The interpretation of this integral equation is as follows: the ￿rst part of the right hand side
gives the probability that the system, being currently in state i, never leaves state i until ￿.
In this case j = i and ￿ij = 1, so 1 ￿ Qi (￿) is the survival probability in state i. If j 6= i;
￿ij = 0: The second part of the right hand side collects all cases in which the transition from
i to j (which includes i) occurred via another state k 6= i. First, we take the probability that
the process stayed in state i for a period of length x and passed to state k then (captured
by Qik (x)). Then we need the probability that the process which is in state k after x will
be in state j at ￿ (captured by pkj (￿ ￿ x)). As the transition from i to k can be anywhere
between 0 and ￿, we have to integrate over x in order to cover all possible transitions.
Equation (A.11) can slightly be rewritten, provided that Qik (x) is once di⁄erentiable
(which holds for our case), as
pij (￿) = (1 ￿ Qi (￿))￿ij + ￿k6=i
Z ￿
0




The derivative dQik (x)=dx now gives the density of going from i to k after duration x.
Multiplied by the probability pkj (￿ ￿ x) of subsequently going from k to j (which may
include many intermediate transitions to other states) gives the density of ending up in j
after having gone to k after x: Integrating over all durations x gives the probability of starting
in i and being in j at ￿:
A.5.2 Our two-state system
We now need to adjust the notation such that it suits our purposes. We look at a worker who
just moved in t (like today) into either employment e or unemployment u. De￿ne Qeu (￿)
as the probability that a worker who just found a job in t ￿jumps￿to u in a period of time
27We di⁄er from the notation in the cited literature in that we explicitly write j 6= i here or k 6= i
below. This is equivalent to setting the transition rate from i to i to zero. As our application does not
have transitions from i to i (i.e. transition rates from i to i are zero), we ￿nd using j 6= i explicitly more
intuitive for our purpose. We are indebted to Ludwig Fahrmeir for various communications on Semi-Markov
processes. For an excellent introduction in German, see Fahrmeir et al. (1981).
36shorter or equal to ￿ ￿ t. With a duration s dependent arrival rate ￿(s(v)); this is then
simply given by




where s(v) = v￿t is the duration in her current state. In perfect analogy and using a spell-
dependent arrival rate ￿(s(v)), we get Que (￿) = 1 ￿ e￿
R ￿
t ￿(s(v))dv. For the complementary
events - remaining in a given state - the probabilities are simply Qee (￿) = 1 ￿ Qeu (￿) and
Quu (￿) = 1￿Que (￿): The probabilities that a transition takes place at all in this two state
process are
Qe (￿) ￿ Qeu (￿); Qu (￿) ￿ Que (￿): (A.14)
With two possible states, we have four transition probabilities for the future: an unem-
ployed (employed) person can either be unemployed or employed at some future point in time
￿. Two are redundant as the probability of e.g. an unemployed worker of being employed is
complementary to the probability of being unemployed, pue (￿) = 1 ￿ puu (￿); and similarly
pee (￿) = 1 ￿ peu (￿): Hence, we only focus on puu (￿) and peu (￿): These probabilities are,
using the general equation (A.12),
puu (￿) = 1 ￿ Qu (￿) +
Z ￿
t

















Figure 8 Illustrating transition probabilities
Let￿ s consider puu (￿) : An individual unemployed in t can be unemployed in ￿ by always
remaining unemployed. This is the term 1￿Qu (￿): The individual can be unemployed in ￿
by remaining unemployed until v where she jumps into employment, the density for which
is dQue (v)=dv: After v; the probability of returning to unemployment in the remaining time
span of ￿ ￿ v is peu (￿ ￿ v): Note that this probability includes an arbitrary number of
transitions larger than zero in this remaining period ￿ ￿ v: In contrast to integrating over x
as in (A.12), we integrate over the point in time v here simply as this is more intuitive. The
interpretation for peu (￿) is in perfect analogy.
As a last step, we need to determine the two derivatives dQue (v)=dv and dQeu (v)=dv.



























37Given (A.14) and the derivatives, the equations (A.15) become

















The ￿nal adjustment we need to make is to replace ￿(s(v)) by ￿ as the separation rate is
assumed to be constant. This then gives equations (16) in the main text.
B Appendix
All references to appendices starting with B are available upon request.
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